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Blacklisting and Reporting in Seasonal Worker Programs 
Rochelle Bailey
This In Brief examines the practice of blacklisting in sea-
sonal worker programs such as Australia’s Seasonal Worker 
Program (SWP) and New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal 
Employer scheme (RSE). Blacklisting occurs when workers 
are permanently or temporarily excluded from programs. It 
can vary from two to five years, or be indefinite, depending on 
the offence. The practice of blacklisting is rarely highlighted 
and should be discussed as there are implications for all 
stakeholders. This paper raises these issues in the context of 
ni-Vanuatu in the RSE scheme.
The main impetus for this paper is to highlight what hap-
pens when workers are blacklisted, some of the reasons 
behind this, and how growers are affected when perceived 
problematic workers are not reported to government labour 
sending units in future seasons.
Deported seasonal workers are well documented within 
labour sending units. Currently in Vanuatu there are 106 
workers on the Employment Services Unit (ESU) ban list and a 
further 1300 on the stand-down list.1 Although this number 
may seem alarming it covers both the RSE scheme and SWP 
since 2007. By contrast inappropriate behaviour by workers is 
not always documented. Often workers are not penalised for 
inappropriate behaviours. 
Impacts on workers
Blacklisting is a grey area. Although workers have been black-
listed for justifiable reasons, I have also documented cases of 
when they have not (Bailey 2014). Tanya Basok (2002) wrote 
extensively on how blacklisting was used as a threat to main-
tain compliant workers in the Canadian Seasonal Agricultural 
Workers Program (SAWP). Many of these types of cases have 
been witnessed within the RSE scheme and SWP, espe-
cially the threat of being blacklisted, which is used to ensure 
workers are compliant while participating in the programs. If 
workers do not follow the rules of the program, or individual 
employers, then they are penalised through blacklisting: ‘The 
controlled nature of their recruitment, their fear of losing an 
opportunity to participate in the employment program, makes 
workers acquiescent’ (Basok: 2002:15). 
I have noted examples of these threats throughout my 
research conducted with workers in Australia and New 
Zealand. Examples include comments such as, ‘If they don’t 
like it, there are plenty more in the Pacific lined up to take their 
place’ (anon.), ‘… we just sent these guys to [another] farm 
because they were working too slowly, so keep the pace or 
you can be replaced too’ and ‘if you complain you can go 
home’. Tipples and Rawlinson (2014: 26) highlighted an RSE 
mediation case where the mediator stated, ‘if you don’t go 
back and work this out, you are in breach of your visa and 
you all need to go home [and] that broke any resistance to the 
problem straight away’.
My research (Bailey 2009, 2014) has highlighted that 
personality differences and various power relations between 
workers and their employers or supervisors jeopardise future 
employment opportunities. Five of my longitudinal RSE research 
participants have been blacklisted. Three of these were for 
alcohol abuse and damage to property, but the reason for the 
other two is more difficult to say as it has been argued that 
there was no evidence that their behaviours were inappropriate 
during their visa stays. However there was evidence of person-
ality differences and power struggles between these men and 
their New Zealand supervisor, who inappropriately used his 
position of power to threaten the workers (Bailey 2009). One of 
these workers asked the Vanuatu ESU why was he blacklisted 
and was not given a reason. 
A noticeable trend mentioned recently by New Zealand’s 
deputy high commissioner in Vanuatu, as well as a number of 
employers at recent RSE and SWP gatherings, is the number 
of long-term workers that are being blacklisted:
I don’t know if that is due to complacency or know-
ing the system … if it’s the stresses placed on them 
from multiple visits. I am not too sure, we don’t want 
issues like this to derail from the positive aspects of 
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the scheme … we can’t let the actions of a few spoil 
it for everyone … at the same time we have to look at 
the underlying reasons why issues like that happen.2
Control creates resistance and, as mentioned above, long-
term workers do show some complacency to regulations. 
Even though workers accept the conditions of their employ-
ment contracts, and have various forms of coping with the 
restrictions, they do sometimes resist but not usually in ways 
in which they will be removed from the program (Bailey 2009). 
Impacts on employers and labour sending units
After being blacklisted from one scheme, many workers try 
their luck in entering the other. This is concerning for both 
the sending countries and, more importantly, the employer. 
Recently I had a conversation with an SWP employer who 
had concerns about a worker from another Pacific country 
because rumours were circulating that he had been blacklis-
ted from the RSE scheme for inappropriate conduct. Enquiries 
with New Zealand’s RSE manager confirmed the rumours, yet 
the labour sending unit of that country was not aware of the 
issue with this particular worker. This is not an isolated case. It 
can be difficult for labour sending units to know if an applicant 
has been blacklisted as often they will change their name in 
order to seek another opportunity. I have documented this on 
a number of occasions. 
The Vanuatu ESU requires team leaders to report back in 
regards to workers’ behaviours. As discussed in a previous In 
Brief, this debriefing process needs to be improved, as it can 
lead to further problems with future employers when non-com-
pliant workers are not reported. Another difficulty is that often 
employers remove workers from their own list, but don’t report 
them. Reasons for this include employers not having time 
for reporting or their reliance on team leaders to do so. As 
a consideration to other growers, employers should take the 
time to report workers that have been a problem for them, 
not just move the problem worker to another employer. Non-
etheless, to ensure their continued participation in the scheme 
the Vanuatu government has clearly demonstrated that the 
practice of blacklisting will be used to punish those that do not 
comply with the schemes’ or their own regulations and expect-
ations (Bailey, 2009:164–165).
Conclusion
Strengthening application processes for these schemes is 
paramount not only for the reputation of the labour sending 
country but also for maintaining the supply of reliable, hon-
est workers to growers. Reporting templates for employers 
and team leaders – on workers who have either not worked 
satisfactorily or have conducted themselves inappropriately 
during their time – should be mandatory. These reports should 
be given to sending units to manage and monitor workers. 
Workers should also have rights to discuss any reports made 
against them with the labour sending units, with a mediator if 
appropriate. With the increased number of workers entering 
into the RSE scheme and SWP, safety systems should be 
in place so that workers and employers can be confident of 
positive outcomes in participation and management of these 
schemes. 
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Endnotes
1. Data provided by Julie Reedman, Vanuatu Employment 
Service. 9 April 2018. The ban list prevent workers from 
returning, whereas the stand-down list prevents them from 
doing so for a limited period of time. In 2017, Vanuatu sent 
approximately 6500 workers to these seasonal worker 
programs.
2. Youngman Park, Team Leaders Workshop, Port Vila 30 
June 2017
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